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INTERVENTION
Some thoughts on the problem of ‘popular/public history’
in China
Gotelind Mu¨ller*
Centre for East Asian Studies, Institute of Chinese Studies, University of Heidelberg,
Germany
In this study, the author uses the example of China to point out the
cultural premises that the current western notions of ‘popular’ and
‘public’ and a simple equation of both entail. Given China’s cultural and
political layout, which diﬀers from modern western societies, the author
does not subscribe to the view of an antagonistic relationship between
both in the Chinese case. Instead, she suggests that there is a need to
develop a more reﬂected conﬁguration of particular notions of ‘popular’
and ‘public’ and their relationship by looking into diﬀerent layers of
meaning on historical, cultural and political levels to situate the terms in
speciﬁc contexts. Through a discussion of two recent examples of foreign
history on screen in China, a television series on the ‘Great Powers’ since
1500 AD and a party-educational documentary on Soviet history, the
way in which diﬀerent modes of globalization are played out in Chinese
‘public’ history is examined. The author argues that the case of China is
not just one other setting, but that the inner East-Asian ﬂows, so
important in ‘popular culture’ in that region of the world, urge us to
think also in a more complex way about ‘globalization’ as a by no means
necessarily or inherently western-deﬁned process.
Keywords: concepts of ‘public’ and ‘popular’; Chinese media; history
education; history on television; Daguo jueqi; Ju an si wei; globalization;
East Asia
The problem of terms
The ﬁrst thing one ponders, as a writer who specializes in Chinese studies,
when asked to write something about popular/public history in China is:
What do we actually mean by ‘popular’ or by ‘public’ in China? How do
these concepts which might seem unproblematic and fairly straightforward
in their English use, at least at ﬁrst glance, translate into Chinese? Or rather:
Which Chinese terms would correspond? In fact, there is a range of options
in Chinese terminology, depending on what kind of ‘popular’ or ‘public’ one
intends to express. Before going into terminology matters brieﬂy, this paper
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ﬁrst looks at how other colleagues in Chinese studies dealt with the issue of
the ‘popular’ in China. In their edited volume entitled ‘popular China’,
Link, Madsen, and Pickowicz start with the following comment:
This is a book about the people of China, not the abstract People as deﬁned by
the government of the People’s Republic, not the imagined subjects of a
socialist state, but actual living, desiring, struggling people trying to make
sense of who they are and how they should act in the rapidly globalizing
economy and culture of the early twenty-ﬁrst century. (Link, Madsen, and
Pickowicz 2002, 1)
The book bears the subtitle Unoﬃcial culture in a globalizing society.
Now, why do the editors need to start like this? Obviously, the English term
‘popular’ is as a word connected to ‘people’, but what is not immediately
clear is how this relation is shaped: is it of the people or for the people? And
in China – above all – who deﬁnes who ‘the people/People’ are in the ﬁrst
place? By the capital letter, the editors express a diﬀerentiation between
people and People, pointing at the claims of the Chinese socialist state to
deﬁne who the ‘People’ (renmin) are (which has, for example, juridical
implications: only those ‘counting’ as such enjoy constitutional rights),
juxtaposing ‘their’ own notion of ‘people’. Via the subtitle, they furthermore
equate ex negativo the ‘People’ and the ‘oﬃcial’, and explicitly the ‘people’
with ‘unoﬃcial’. To this they add the dichotomy of ‘abstract’ and ‘actual
living’, thus oﬀering the opposition of People–oﬃcial–abstract vs people–
unoﬃcial–living as an opposition between discourse and practice. ‘Popular’
then means social (potentially subversive) practice vs ‘oﬃcial’ state
discourse, which brings to mind de Certeau’s notion of the ‘popular’ as
tactics of resistance in the ‘art’ of living vs power-backed top-down
‘information’ (adding to mere conceptual distinction the perspective of
active resistance from below) (de Certeau 1984). Thus, one of the points to
keep in mind is whether this binary model works, or rather, to what degree?
Remaining for a moment further with ‘popular’, the term is already
ambiguous in English: Do we intend that something is ‘popular with’ many
individuals, do we intend ‘popular’ as opposed to elitist, as amateurish vs
specialist or as societal vs state connected? Depending on which aspect one
focuses upon, onewould represent it diﬀerently in Chinese, e.g. ‘shou huanying
de’ or ‘liuxing de’ for ‘popular with’, ‘tongsu de’ for ‘non-elitist’ (with a slightly
derogatory nuance in Chinese), ‘minjian de’ as opposed to ‘state-connected’,
etc. ‘Popular culture’ can be rendered diﬀerently, but usually would be
represented/translated by ‘mass culture’ (minzhong/dazhong wenhua), reﬂect-
ing ‘ideological’ inﬂuences in Chinese terminology, whereas from the above-
named ‘renmin’ (people/People) one may as well construct the adjective
(renmin de). It simply depends on what kind of ‘popular’ one intends.
As for ‘public’, things are a little less complicated, but still one should
brieﬂy reﬂect the term: the ﬁrst thing that comes to mind is ‘public’ as
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opposed to ‘private’, something that is to be seen by or is accessible ‘openly’
to an indiscriminate number of people. However, ‘public’ covers also the
notion of something connected to authority (the state). Depending on how
the ‘public sphere’ is working, i.e. which actors are entitled to participate,
the ‘societal’ or the ‘state-connected’ meaning is more decisive. In fact, in
Chinese, to render ‘public’, one usually would choose between various
combinations, with the main character ‘gong’, in itself having an ‘oﬃcial’,
state-related connotation. Thus, not surprisingly, for China there is an
intensive debate going on in Chinese studies about whether China ever
developed a ‘public sphere’ in the past, if so, when and in what sense (since
Habermas’ conception reﬂects the speciﬁc conditions and historical
experiences of European bourgeois society not one to one transferable to
other cultural or political contexts), and how the present situation should be
evaluated in this regard. (Cases often discussed recently include the
contested impact of the Internet for furthering the development of a ‘public
sphere’ in present-day China) (Yang 2009; see also Berry 2010).
Clearly, in today’s China, for ‘public’ history, which is the focus of
reﬂection here, the role of the state is still central. History is seen as an
important area of identity formation and self-representation. This not only
grows out of socialist governance, but also has deep roots in Chinese
tradition. The whole range of history education is therefore tightly
controlled. History is also transported via state-sponsored media, museums
etc., whereas the participation of non-state actors in the history ‘market’ is
still secondary and only possible as far as it does not openly collide with the
state’s claim to interpretative monopoly.
Thus, when one talks of ‘popular/public’ (the slash representing an ‘and’
or ‘or’, not a ‘vs’), this approach is problematic in the Chinese case, since
‘public’ does not go well with ‘popular’ in the sense of ‘unoﬃcial’ here.
However, owing to limited opening-up, there are also non-governmental
actors involved in the ‘public’ now, complicating the earlier alternative
picture of ‘public’ ¼ ‘oﬃcial’. In fact, one of the things that challenge
someone working on history education and history in the Chinese media of
today is the constant cross-over between the ‘oﬃcial’ and the ‘unoﬃcial’ in
social practice, thus troubling the above-cited clear-cut binary model of
Link et al. as well. Obviously, state censorship in China is a structurally
limiting factor to the development of a ‘truly free’ ‘market of opinions’ also
on history, history education itself being a central pillar of identity politics,
closely monitored by the state. But within these limits there is much
negotiation going on. However, this negotiation not only consists in a simple
testing of these limits, as is often assumed in the west (and here also the
limits of de Certeau’s point of consumers’ ‘resistance’ become evident), but
one notes also a strong ‘popular’ support for oﬃcial views on history, being
deeply engrained via streamlined history education, except for some
dissenting views which usually get more publicity in western media reports
Rethinking History 231
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on China. Thus, the opposition of ‘oﬃcial’ but not-believed history views vs
believed but too-cautious-to-be-openly-acknowledged unoﬃcial ones is
largely a western construct – or just wishful thinking. Reality is more
complex, representing a web of interrelations between the ‘general public’
and the state. One of the links between the two is certainly nationalism, but
it is not the only one. Psychological factors are important as well, since the
‘normal’ populace has become accustomed to ‘oﬃcial’ interpretations and
has largely internalized them without questioning. Economic factors (what
kind of history sells?), consumerist passivity (I prefer never to get challenged
on my acquired ‘beliefs’), entertainment issues (this is for fun; if it is done
well, who cares about ‘truth’ in that context?) or sometimes the sheer fun of
diﬀerence (which should be distinguished from conscious ‘dissent’) play a
role as well. Thus, the picture today is much more variable than it used to
be.
History and globalization in China
Many observers of China have attested to the great appeal which historical
topics have to Chinese audiences – something not only with a long tradition
in China, but also to be found all over East Asia. History soaps are on prime
time television, sometimes reconﬁrming oﬃcially cherished views of history,
sometimes challenging them.1 Bookshops sell a lot of books on historical
topics, mostly related to biographies. Museums and memorials are
mushrooming all over China (Denton 2005; Vickers 2007). Theme parks
with historical topics have started to appear (e.g. in Xi’an on Tang dynasty
times), and even in city planning ‘fake’ traditional architecture is promoted
(Broudehoux 2004; Meyer 2008).2 DVDs or VCDs on historical topics,
recently often historical documentaries ‘telling the truth’, are sold on the
streets. Old photographs and regional history are ‘in’, demonstrating a drive
towards more pluralism in views of history, claiming to be an opening up of
who ‘owns’ history and who is represented by it. The government itself
promotes chosen historical sites via ‘patriotic education’ and encourages
‘red travel’ tours to places crucial for the Chinese revolution and its agents.
All these activities reﬂect ongoing negotiations on the domestic history
‘market’, often connected to questions of national or regional or personal
identity, and – at times – to ‘new nationalism’ (Gries 2004), which serves as a
surrogate for Marxist ideology, to which most Chinese today only pay lip-
service at best.
What is a fairly new feature, however, is the recent interest in more
historical information about foreign history. This, of course, can be
connected to identity politics as well (as a model to emulate or as ‘the
other’, delineating and proﬁling the ‘self’), but it also has the potential of
freeing history from the direct ‘service’ to national identity. (Remember the
dictum current in Mao’s time of ‘using the past to serve the present’, mainly
232 G. Mu¨ller
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being directed towards the Chinese past, since everything should ‘serve the
[Chinese] People’ (wei renmin fuwu), including history.) Paying attention to
foreign history is therefore a double-edged enterprise (negatively attested to
also by a temporary downgrading of education in foreign history during
earlier PRC times, namely in ‘leftist’ periods – except for ‘world revolutions’
and similar ideologically acceptable topics).
A case in point is the recent television seriesDaguo jueqi [Rise of the great
powers] in late 2006. This series was launched with great fanfare, assisted by a
book collection (CCTV 2006, 2007) and works modeled on it, creating
considerable excitement. In school, all children in China get acquainted with
‘world history’ to somedegree, thus rendering certain images of foreign history
familiar with the Chinese pupils (and, to be fair, one should stress here that
knowledge on foreign history in China is deﬁnitelymuch higher than the other
way round, i.e. than knowledge on Chinese history in other countries, at least
in western ones) (Mu¨ller 2011). However, as the popularity of the seriesDaguo
jueqi made clear, there is a perceived longing to ‘know more’ about other
countries, especially if they were and are ‘successful’, presenting a mix of
touristic and historical curiosity, mingledwith nationalist feelings of ‘knowing
the other for surpassing it in the future’. The television series presented a new
format to the Chinese audience, attracting it via well-known images, e.g. from
the world history textbooks everybody read in school, but being much more
lavishly illustrated, blending touristic highlights in the countries discussed
(Portugal, Spain, the Netherlands, the UK, France, Japan, Germany, Russia/
Soviet Union and the US) with historical information provided by the
narrator, interviews with ‘international scholars’ (including Chinese),
computer-generated imagery, animations of famous paintings or other visual
tricks for entertainment, and present-day street scenes, thus deliberately
blurring past and present. The basic ‘ideological’ idea is to ‘understand the
miracle of the rise of nations’ – in order to copy it. However, it is disputable
whether the audience shared this view throughout, since many just took it as a
welcome introduction to ‘the world’ in front of the television at home, often
not yet beingwell-oﬀ enough todo trips to foreign countries themselves (which
goes well with de Certeau’s observation on the need to acknowledge the
autonomy of reception).3 The television series was also a socially respectable
entertainment, since it catered to the ‘cultural formation’ of the viewer, andnot
mere tourism, by its claim to historical ‘education’ and meticulousness in
including ‘expert’ comments. Furthermore, since Chinese history is especially
closely monitored, new information of others’ history appeared to be very
attractive, being also full of newvisual experiences, at least to those viewers not
personally familiar with foreign countries. So there was also hope for getting
something less ‘ideological’, but still of historical interest to enjoy, a kind of
new, unmitigated window onto the great world.
Surveys seem to indicate that the audience of such ‘serious’ historical
television presentations4 mainly consists in well-educated, fairly well-oﬀ
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urban males in their 30s or 40s, but as blogs suggest, there was a particularly
broad interest in Daguo jueqi, obviously because it also addressed the public
via many channels, including the accompanying book series and other items,
also marking a new quality of marketing such products in China. Thus, one
could inform oneself with books on speciﬁc countries in more detail, but
also follow the whole itinerary of the Chinese ﬁlm crew, who again represent
fairly young, well-educated, urban people. They wrote about their work,
what they experienced and how the interviews were done. Thus, one seems
to get closer to the whole process of creating such a television series than
merely enjoying its result. Rather, one may accompany the ﬁlm crew
through the process and – above all – their experiences of living in foreign
countries.
Interestingly, on closer scrutiny, the series was not homogeneous at all,
thus not providing a uniﬁed ‘moral of the tale’, e.g. politically more
‘sensitive’ topics, such as the part on the Soviet Union, were done in a more
‘traditional’ way, having a lot of ‘Chinese experts’ providing the ‘correct’
(orthodox) understanding of that state, whereas parts on Portugal and Spain
(with less contemporary ‘salience’ – and of course fewer Chinese ‘experts’,
these countries being rare subjects in Chinese academia) were much freer to
focus on historical matters and touristic highlights. As occasional talks with
a Chinese colleague involved in the series suggest, although the teams
worked mostly separately, general decisions were taken beforehand on
which topics should be addressed. Consequently, for example, the ‘most
important’ countries were presented in two installments, whereas ‘less
important’ ones were covered in one or – as with Portugal and Spain – in
only half an episode. Thus, it was the UK, the US and Russia/the Soviet
Union that received more intensive treatment. However, when watching the
series, viewers get very diﬀerent impressions of, for example, the US.
Whereas the US-dedicated installments draw mostly positive conclusions,
the Soviet Union episode continuously attacks the ‘wrong’ system of the US
in the twentieth century, highlighting the Stalinist counter-model. Thus, in
the series itself, a space is opened up for reﬂection on the part of the
audience as to what conclusion should be drawn from these two diﬀerent
‘historical experiences’, whereas in other installments ‘problematic’ issues
are simply skipped (e.g. the one on Germany does not even deal with the
GDR, but jumps from 1945 to reuniﬁcation, or the one on Japan very
hastily moves over the 1930s and 1940s, drawing a lot of ‘public’ criticism
for doing so).
What is provided by such a series, however, is a cautiously more
globalized outlook of historical views: foreign ‘experts’ can be heard in the
original voice (the Chinese subtitles sometimes being tendentious renderings,
but to those able to understand the particular language some ‘direct access’
is provided at least) and ‘original’ places can be seen. By linking up with
popularly known images, such as those already encountered in school, these
234 G. Mu¨ller
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images are reinforced. In this sense, there in fact is a more global ‘historical
literacy’ also in China: the Mona Lisa and the French Revolution do mean
at least something to an average Chinese, though western art is at the
‘cultural capital’ extreme, the French Revolution at the ‘ideological’ one
(with a complicated trajectory of evaluation in the PRC, by the way, but
today being simply hailed as ‘the Great French Revolution’). Interestingly,
there are shifts going on even in ‘oﬃcial’ history education, which tends to
integrate now more recent and ‘popular’ features of foreign cultures as well,
namely American ones, breaking up the canon of established ‘high-culture
plus world revolution’ issues ‘worth’ knowing (e.g. in middle-school world
history, pupils now also learn about Hollywood, jazz or Picasso) (Zhonghua
Renmin Gongheguo Jiaoyubu 2001, 32).
Another example of global inﬂuences in present-day China is the re-use of
foreign soundtracks. International blockbusters such as Titanic or recently
Avatar are also doing very well in China, though subject to many restrictions
(e.g. only to be seen for a very limited time in cinemas; however, piratedDVDs
are immediately on sale). When soundtracks of such western blockbusters are
re-used inChinese oﬃcial ﬁlmic productions, they are to appeal unconsciously
to a Chinese audience impressed by Hollywood style. A rather surprising case
in point is a Chinese oﬃcial historical documentary on the ‘perishing’ of the
SovietUnion (Ju an si wei 2007). Although the documentary was explicitly ‘for
internal use only’ to educate cadres, i.e. not a production intended for the
‘broad masses’ like Daguo jueqi, but a heavily ideological piece of cadre
streamlining before confronting ‘the People’, it nevertheless re-used sound-
tracks from capitalist blockbusters, namely Pirates of the Caribbean, Pearl
Harbor, The Rock and Troy – as a ﬁlm-loving student of mine immediately
realized. Except for the usual quick accusations directed towards China of
property theft and except for reasons of simple embellishment of a dry piece,
what does itmean to have such ‘western consumerist’ soundtracks accompany
an (in that case) heavily ideological historical documentary? Is it intended to
appeal to subconscious feelings to making viewers ‘swallow’ ideological
contents more easily – or at least make them bear hours of auctorial
commented documentary pieces on Soviet history far below anything worth
considering ﬁlm art, given the fact that cadres could not but participate in the
viewing? It is not very probable that it was only a convenient device to avoid
bothering about composing their own soundtracks, since on closer scrutiny the
use is deliberate: ‘bad’ ﬁgures are always introduced by sinister (western)
musical pieces, whereas the good ones are represented by Russian folk music
or marches, and the constant re-use of the same pieces works for emotional
reinforcement of intended messages. (Whether in reality the use of such
soundtracks also works sometimes in an unintended subversive manner is of
course open to speculation.5)
Thus, from these two examples of (1) a ‘public’ history also ‘popular
with’ the ‘people’ (Daguo jueqi) and (2) a ‘public’ history explicitly intended
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as the state’s educational message for the ‘People’ represented by their
supposed leaders, the cadres (Ju an si wei), one may argue that both ‘types’
are not simply to be opposed to each other: on the one hand, there is
convergence, e.g. when both ‘public histories’ intersect in content (in
portraying the Soviet Union in ‘orthodox’ fashion), but on the other hand,
there is also divergence, which, however, does not necessarily follow the line
between both. Rather, ‘global’ elements, including visual and audio ones,
work on diﬀerent levels and for various interests in Chinese ‘public’ views on
history: they might work to open up new windows, spiraling free from
ideological straight-jackets and catering more to ‘popular’ taste. But they
are also put to use by the authorities to bolster their historical ‘public’ views.
Both ways of ‘glocalization’ twist the ‘original’, be it in a ‘touristic gaze’ or
be it in using ‘capitalist’ elements for propagating ‘socialist’ contents.
Furthermore, as the above-cited examples, especially that of Daguo jueqi
intended for the ‘broad masses’ and its new visual design testify, the chance
to watch foreign ﬁlm productions has had a competitive technical impact in
China: more attention to visual lavishness, CGI, animations etc. are today
expected and appreciated also by a Chinese audience. Whereas the ﬁgure of
the auctorial narrator is very well-known from ‘oﬃcial’ propaganda (the
‘expository mode’; Nichols 2001, chap. 6), the reference to interviews with
‘experts’ to ‘scientiﬁcally prove’ interpretative points, and the general fad for
seemingly ‘unmitigated’ documentaries which counterbalance the fashion
for historical dramas or soaps (which from the outset are obvious ‘remakes’)
are new. This reﬂects the double-bind of ‘popular’ history to the desire for
‘objective’ information, on the one hand, and entertainment, on the other.
And both promise to provide more tangible experiences of history to their
audience than those that the latter knew from school. Even state-sponsored
‘traditional’ educational pieces for party members (such as Ju an si wei) have
to attune – if only for ‘tunes’.
This general picture began to emerge mainly from the 1990s – not the least
because the Chinese Government realized in the context of the end of the Cold
War that it had to face competition with western inﬂuences andmodels. Thus,
for example, in history education, while stressing ‘ideological correctness’ of
contents and promoting ‘patriotic education’ to appeal also to students’
emotions (e.g. documented in then-president Jiang Zemin’s intervention to
that purpose in 1991) (Kecheng jiaocai yanjiusuo 2001, 607–8), the layout of
history textbooks was seen as ‘too outmoded’. Teams were sent around the
world to investigate history education in diﬀerent countries, leading to some
experimenting with more open forms of history teaching and more
investigative elements in textbooks, besidesmodernizing the layout. Similarly,
ﬁlm and – to a lesser degree – television have followed international trends
more closely, and semi-privatization (in terms of funding) has given a further
stimulus to cater to the expectations of an audience nowadays familiar with
non-Chinese productions (Zhu and Berry 2009; White 2005, chap. 4).
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However, it might be important to add here something often overlooked
when speaking about globalization in non-western countries, which usually
is interpreted as the joining of and subscription to ‘western’ (i.e. above all
US) deﬁned ‘global’ discourses and standards. Even though this might often
be the case, it is important to look at East Asia more closely, since it
provides an example that complicates that picture: in fact, especially with
‘popular’ culture, the inner-Asian ﬂows are very inﬂuential as well. Namely,
Japan has in many respects played the role of the trendsetter, be it in
karaoke or manga. And to mainland Chinese, Hong Kong and Taiwan
(already having ‘digested’ elements from the ‘west’ as from Japan
themselves) are important models as well (even reﬂected in language by
creating the common denominator ‘gang-tai’, i.e. Hong Kong/mandarin:
Xiang gang and Taiwan, e.g. ‘gang-taimusic’, etc.). In the sector of television
dramas, Korea has recently joined in and created a frenzy ‘wave’ on its own.
Furthermore, given the fact of a substantial overseas Chinese community
present in diﬀerent places in Asia as in the ‘west’, and with intensifying
relations between them and the Chinese ‘motherland’, their role has to be
counted in as well. For example, returning to cases taken from historical
television series which are not only aired but also distributed as VCDs or
DVDs, these are widely circulated among overseas Chinese who also
participate in discourses about such productions via the Internet, etc., and
by buying them (or not) also have some inﬂuence on the economic ‘success’
of the latter. In short, ‘globalization’ in China does not mean a one-sided
(heading ‘west’) movement from local to global, but a process on multiple
layers and in various directions.
Conclusion
In sum, what the Chinese case might contribute to thinking about ‘popular/
public history’ is at the most obvious level the decisive inﬂuence of socio-
political contexts, preventing the presupposition of the ubiquitous working
of a ‘western’ market system together with a corresponding ‘public sphere’
dominated by society. However, even if ‘popular’ (if taken in the sense of
‘unoﬃcial’ as in Link et al. (2002)) and ‘public’ are not only not working
parallel here, but rather used in opposition to each other, globalization has
changed the local situation, complicating the relationship between both.
Thus, a clear-cut divide between top and bottom is simply misleading. The
picture which emerges is rather that of a web of interrelations, cutting across
‘public’ and ‘unoﬃcial/popular’, government and the people, discourses and
practices (both in the plural), regions, generations, gender or types of media,
held together by various knots, ranging from new nationalism over
psychological habits to consumerist expectations. It is still too early to
speak of any kind of ‘cosmopolitanism’ in China, but as the few examples
referred to above have suggested, globalization has of course also taken
Rethinking History 237
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
Mü
ll
er
, 
Go
te
li
nd
] 
At
: 
10
:5
6 
19
 M
ay
 2
01
1
place in the ‘history market’, though in a multidirectional way. This might
again help to avoid thinking of globalization as being inherently ‘western-
deﬁned’, leading to a more varied understanding of the latter, paying
attention also to (East Asian) intraregional models and ﬂows. And one
should not overlook the fact that, as de Certeau (1984) aptly observed,
structural changes do not yet provide an answer to the question of how
individuals perceive them. China here serves as a reminder of the inherent
complexities in the interplay between structures, intended messages and
individual reception.
Notes
1. For the contested case of a historical television drama on Chinese modern history
which ended up being taken oﬀ the screen, causing a major incident of unexpected
ﬁnancial loss for the oﬃcial CCTV (China Central Television), see Mu¨ller (2007).
2. A good example is Beijing’s face-lifting mainly connected to the Olympics to
showcase ‘true’ Chineseness, though apparently appreciated more by its own people
thrown out of their old traditional courtyard houses to relocate in modern concrete
apartment blocks than by foreign tourists, who bemoan the ‘Disney’ character.
3. One might add that today well over 90% of Chinese households all over the
country possess a television and that watching television is one of the top-
ranking spare-time activities.
4. In China, there is a strict divide between self-proclaimed ‘serious’ historical
presentations which are scrutinized closely before going to the screen, and
‘entertaining’ renderings which from the outset make clear to the viewer their
completely ﬁctional character, only using historical settings.
5. For example, at least to a western eye, the smiling, open face of an easily chatting
Gorbachev in the documentary thwarts the ideological ‘negative’ comment and
the sinister soundtrack, rendering the whole enterprise of debunking that
particular politician as the scheming gravedigger of the ‘ﬁrst socialist state in
human history’ more than unconvincing. (The problem behind this was simply
that the footage had to be taken from international or Soviet media of the time,
which had no reason to present him in a negative light.)
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